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[Excerpt] The Campbell experience demonstrates that many strategies of late twentieth-century 
capitalism had precursors earlier in the century. Many components of Campbell's strategy, surprisingly, 
are as typical of today's neoliberal globalizing economy as was RCA's escape to a Mexican export-
processing zone. The Campbell Soup Company made heavy use of contingent labor, increasing its 
workforce by 50 percent during tomato harvest season, then laying these workers off eight weeks later, 
just as multinational corporations today hire various types of nonstandard workers to handle specific 
tasks and add to flexibility. Campbell Soup was an eager advocate of transnational labor migration, 
importing thousands of workers from Puerto Rico, Mexico, and the English-speaking Caribbean to fill 
certain functions, just as immigrants fill niches in today's "global cities." The corporation used immigrants 
in another way, similar to today's clothing retailers who deny any responsibility for the working conditions 
of sweatshop laborers officially employed by subcontractors. The firm paid suppliers prices that left them 
little choice but to exploit largely immigrant farm laborers to the furthest limits possible. The company 
constantly revolutionized production methods, employing technology and "scientific management" 
techniques to replace workers and lower costs, and even experimented with practices remarkably similar 
to many of the features of today's "lean production." Over time, Campbell implemented a few limited 
paternalistic elements to its dealings with its workers but mostly resorted to an adversarial position 
toward the unions they organized. The firm had a reputation, especially from the 1930s through the 
1960s, as the most antiunion of Camden's "Big Three" employers, foreshadowing the "get-tough" policies 
toward unions common in the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, when structural changes in the food supply 
system finally made it possible, Campbell joined RCA in abandoning Camden as a production site, over a 
century after Joseph Campbell began the company in that city, the last act in the deindustrialization of 
Camden. The fact that it resisted relocating production for so long makes Campbell Soup an excellent 
case for studying the other techniques available to corporations, and its long history may hold important 
lessons about the consequences of such strategies. 
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* CONDENSED CAPITALISM 
I 
Introduction 
Global Strategies, Hometown Factories 
Everyone in the United States knows Camp-
bell's Soup, "America's Favorite Food" according to the title of the company-
sanctioned history of the firm.1 The famous red-and-white cans line shelves 
in kitchens fashionable and humble, most people recognize the "Mm, Mm, 
Good" advertising jingle, and Andy Warhols arguably most famous paintings 
are his pop-art reinterpretations of the equally well-known soup cans. The 
quintessential comfort food for many Americans, according to numerous 
memoirs and blogs, is "a bowl of Campbell's Tomato Soup and a grilled 
cheese sandwich." The transformation of Campbell's Soup into an icon of 
American culture was carefully guided by company publicists through the 
use of streetcar signs at the beginning of the twentieth century, and then with 
advertisements in magazines like the Saturday Evening Post and sponsorship of 
the most popular programs on radio and television, including Amos 'n' Andy 
and Lassie. Campbell's marketing and public relations efforts were spectacu-
larly successful, creating a myth of a product and company as wholesome as 
hometown America yet at the forefront of scientific and hygienic modern 
food production. Corporate critic Jim Terry has argued that "some compa-
nies have been so successful in creating a wholesome, 'apple pie' image that 
the myth clouds the reality.... One corporation that has been particularly 
successful in creating and maintaining such an image is the Campbell Soup 
Company."2 On a financial level, the Campbell Soup Company today has 
i 
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annual revenues over seven billion dollars, and the profits resulting from its 
almost total dominance of the condensed soup industry have made the Dor -
rance family one of the wealthiest in the United States. 
Despite the iconic status of the company's flagship product, however, most 
people are unaware of what was behind Campbell management's success 
at generating wealth that started with the company's founding in 1869 in 
Camden, New Jersey. Even more invisible are the people in the soup plants 
who pared the vegetables, blended the ingredients, and ran the labeling 
machines—without whom there would be no Campbell's Soup. 
The company's management philosophy was set in place by the inventor 
of condensed soup, John T. Dorrance (1873—1930), who ran the company 
with a stern zeal during the crucial first three decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. Other members of his family, and later, others schooled in the Camp-
bell way, continued his approach. Dorrance believed that only by tightly 
controlling his supply chains, production, and marketing could he succeed. 
At the starting point of the canned-soup operation, company agronomists 
grew the seeds for the painstakingly developed varieties of tomatoes ideally 
suited for tomato soup, then provided young plants to farmers under strictly 
monitored contracts. The culmination of the process was equally controlled. 
The company's marketing department demanded specific placement of its 
advertisements in magazines and refused to negotiate its pricing policy with 
grocers. 
But it was at the center of the life cycle of the canned soup business, in 
production, that Dorrance paid closest attention in his attempt to scientifi-
cally manage the Campbell Soup Company. Making soup was a difficult 
process to automate, and many procedures remained manual for as long as 
Campbell made soup in Camden. Dorrance simply took this problem as 
another challenge that he would overcome. He refused for years to raise 
his soup s selling price of ten cents, a can and counterbalanced rises in other 
costs by relentlessly pushing down the costs of production. The people on 
the receiving end of his efforts—the production workers—did not conge-
nially accept speedups and intensification of work, and decades-long trench 
warfare ensued. Individual workers found ways to beat the system, and small 
groups were able to undermine foremen's efforts to increase output. But the 
company was equally imaginative in countering opposition to its designs. 
Eventually workers strengthened their position by organizing a militant 
union in 1940 (after a seven-year campaign), and for about three decades the 
two sides faced each other more or less as equals. 
These contending forces—management's drive for low-cost production 
and employees' attempts to achieve some control over their working lives and 
livelihoods—are the foci 
faced by management ir 
used to overcome these 
management practices ir 
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;'s drive for low-cost production 
ntrol over their working lives and 
livelihoods—are the focus of this book. In particular, I examine the obstacles 
faced by management in keeping production costs low and the strategies it 
used to overcome these problems, from Campbell s adoption of scientific 
management practices in 1927 through the plant shutdown in 1990. These 
hurdles were not unique to Campbell Soup; they are, in fact, faced by virtu-
ally every firm in a capitalist economy, although they acquire special promi-
nence at certain times. The push to lower costs that started as a solution to the 
economic crises of the 1970s and continues into the twenty-first century has 
accelerated the drive to work intensification, outsourcing, "offshoring," and 
deindustrialization. Yet these methods of lowering costs have a much longer 
history than most popular accounts acknowledge. The most well known of 
the recent corporate cost-cutting strategies is the movement of production to 
low-cost regions with weak or nonexistent union traditions, as exemplified, 
for example, by Campbell's neighbor across Market Street in Camden, RCA. 
Historian Jefferson Cowie (in his book Capital Moves) has described how 
RCA began moving its assembly work in 1940 to a series of new locations 
in its never-ending "quest for cheap labor."3 
But the particular industry that Campbell was in precluded—or at least 
made unappealing—any solution that included moving the soup plant far 
away. For, while workers in Bloomington or Juarez could assemble television 
receivers as well as anyone in Camden, the tomatoes ripening in South Jer-
sey fields had to be processed into soup within hours of their harvesting. In 
the food-processing industry, location near agricultural inputs is critical, but 
Camden had other attractions that prevented management from seriously 
considering leaving any time in the company's first century. For distribut-
ing its finished products, Camden was ideally situated in the core northeast 
corridor of the United States with direct access to rail and marine transport. 
And the Dorrance family, which watched over the giant company with the 
attention a small proprietor might pay to his family business—for it was the 
family business—could not allow the company's flagship plant to be moved 
out of the family's reach from its base in Philadelphia's wealthy Main Line 
suburbs. As a result, Campbell Soup became even more than an icon of 
consumerism in southern New Jersey. By the mid-twentieth century it had 
become a bedrock institution of the region as well. Older residents remi-
nisced about scrambling among the long lines of farmers' trucks piled high 
with baskets of ripe Jersey tomatoes. Tens of thousands had, at some point in 
their lives, worked at the sprawling soup plant, and everyone driving across 
the Benjamin Franklin Bridge from Philadelphia knew they were in Cam-
den when they saw the red-and-white Campbell's Soup-can-painted water 
towers rising above the factory. 
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FIGURE 1. Industrial Camden, in foreground, Campbell Soup Company Plant No. 1. In center, from 
upper left to lower right, RCA. On the river between RCA and the bridge, Campbell Plant No. 2. At top, 
the Benjamin Franklin Bridge and Philadelphia. 
Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
Campbell Soup Company thus faced a quandary in being unable to run 
away from the problems that, as we shall see, made its achievement of finan-
cial success such a challenge, for the basis of that success by necessity lay in 
Camden and its surrounding farmlands. In this way it had much in com-
mon with many other firms that do not always have the luxury of moving 
production on a whim, a point missed by those who see capital flight as a 
viable strategy for any corporation. When RCA ran from militant unionized 
workers and communities supportive of those workers, Campbell had to stay 
in Camden and fight, or at least find other ways to keep pushing production 
costs down. Because the capital flight option was off the table for most of its 
first century, Campbell can be viewed as a veritable test case for exploring 
those other options that corporations used—and still use—to minimize costs 
and maximize profitability. 
Though the Campbell Soup Company faced many of the same problems 
as RCA, its experience and tactics were markedly different for each of the 
workforce-related obstacles to profitability that RCA overcame by relocating 
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production. Campbell's actions over several decades were complex, but they 
can, for the most part, be categorized as direct responses to three impedi-
ments to profitability: 
Cost of production. Rather than moving to an area with cheaper labor 
costs, Campbell held down wages by dealing harshly with wage 
demands, often refusing to deal with the union at all, and by search-
ing out those groups of workers who would accept low pay. Further, 
the company kept down production costs by constantly revolution-
izing the production process, using automation, "scientific manage-
ment" techniques, and piece rates. 
Increasing sense of entitlement, solidarity, and militancy of workers. Again, 
instead of running away from united and assertive workers, Camp-
bell implemented practices to minimize or actively defeat unity. 
Piecework promoted individualism, the company split the workforce 
between year-round workers and a large contingent of seasonal work-
ers, and, before other employers in Camden, it hired female, African 
American, and Puerto Rican workers, then funneled them into 
distinct and inferior job classifications. 
Community support for workers. One effect of Campbell's labor market 
recruitment strategies was to undermine the community solidarity 
that drove other manufacturers to seek new locations. As Camden's 
major provider of low-wage industrial work, Campbell brought 
into the city's neighborhoods workers from groups without a long 
history there. Some older, more established residents had little sym-
pathy for the aspirations of Campbell workers and even blamed 
Campbell for the "decline" of Camden. Higher-paid employees of 
neighboring RCA and New York Shipbuilding sometimes resented 
the migrant workers that Campbell attracted, who often stayed in the 
area after their work contracts were completed and even "took over 
the neighborhood."4 
Campbell's multifaceted response to these obstacles fell into four broad 
categories. The company directed its greatest efforts toward the control of 
production, with the aim of reducing costs and maximizing efficiency. The 
techniques it used ranged from the adoption of the Bedaux system of scientific 
management in the 1920s to the widespread encouragement in the 1980s of 
quality circles (a management technique imported from Japan to encourage 
"voluntary" worker groups that discussed workplace improvement), and they 
always included the aggressive mechanization of work processes to replace 
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labor with technology Campbell's second strategy grew out of the pecu-
liarities of its labor force requirements: the segmentation of the workforce 
into permanent and seasonal sectors was further exploited by splitting job 
categories along gender, ethnic, and racial lines. The company's third strategy, 
a vicious antiunionism combined with anticommunism, reached its height 
during the McCarthy era but persisted into later decades. The final strategy, 
the movement of production to low-cost, rural sites, started to become a 
viable option in the second half of the twentieth century as mechanization 
of tomato harvesting in California, the interstate highway system, the growth 
of trucking, and deregulation changed the economics of the food-processing 
industry. For Campbell, this strategy began on a limited basis in the 1950s 
and culminated in the transfer of the remaining work in Camden to the 
ultramodern plant in Maxton, North Carolina, in 1990. 
Campbell's strategies and techniques for keeping down production costs 
and workers' militancy worked well enough for it to stay in Camden—while 
remaining highly profitable—for decades, but this was not a one-sided his-
tory Throughout Campbell's long tenure in Camden, workers responded 
in various ways to company strategies, sometimes gaining the upper hand, 
sometimes accommodating company wishes, sometimes suffering defeat. 
For example, when RCA workers were succumbing to company tactics of 
encouraging multiple, competing unions in the 1940s, Campbell's Camden 
workers were solidly united with workers at the Campbell plant in Chicago; 
however, by the end of the decade, Campbell managers joined with the 
ascendant anticommunist Congress of Industrial Organizations leadership 
to split Camden workers from their union brothers and sisters in Chicago. 
Yet most efforts to divide the workers failed. Women working the vegetable 
inspection tables surreptitiously helped each other subvert the production 
incentive system. Black and white shop stewards stood up against tyran-
nical foremen regardless of the workers' race. And the union membership 
returned a leader (an Italian remembered as "a Martin Luther King" by a 
black worker) to office by a landslide vote two months after his conviction 
under the anticommunist provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act.5 
The Campbell experience demonstrates that many strategies of late-
twentieth-century capitalism had precursors earlier in the century. Many 
components of Campbell's strategy, surprisingly, are as typical of today's 
neoliberal globalizing economy as was RCA's escape to a Mexican export-
processing zone. The Campbell Soup Company made heavy use of con-
tingent labor, increasing its workforce by 50 percent during tomato harvest 
season, then laying these workers off eight weeks later, just as multinational 
corporations today hire various types of nonstandard workers to handle 
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specific tasks and add to flexibility. Campbell Soup was an eager advocate of 
transnational labor migration, importing thousands of workers from Puerto 
Rico, Mexico, and the English-speaking Caribbean to fill certain functions, 
just as immigrants fill niches in today's "global cities." The corporation used 
migrants in another way, similar to today's clothing retailers who deny any 
responsibility for the working conditions of sweatshop laborers officially 
employed by subcontractors. The firm paid suppliers prices that left them 
little choice but to exploit largely immigrant farm laborers to the furthest 
limits possible. The company constantly revolutionized production methods, 
employing technology and "scientific management" techniques to replace 
workers and lower costs, and even experimented with practices remarkably 
similar to many of the features of today's "lean production." Over time, Camp-
bell implemented a few limited paternalistic elements to its dealings with its 
workers but mostly resorted to an adversarial position toward the unions they 
organized. The firm had a reputation, especially from the 1930s through the 
1960s, as the most antiunion of Camden's "Big Three" employers, foreshad-
owing the "get-tough" policies toward unions common in the 1980s and 
1990s. Finally, when structural changes in the food supply system finally made 
it possible, Campbell joined RCA in abandoning Camden as a production site, 
over a century after Joseph Campbell began the company in that city, the last 
act in the deindustrialization of Camden. The fact that it resisted relocating 
production for so long makes Campbell Soup an excellent case for studying 
the other techniques available to corporations, and its long history may hold 
important lessons about the consequences of such strategies. 
Of course, the story of the Campbell Soup Company is complicated by 
many other factors beyond those highlighted here. These include the family 
ownership of the company (it was privately held until 1954, and the Dorrance 
family continued to hold a majority of the stock well into the 1990s). The 
types of production at Campbell—a combination of continuous-process but 
mostly small-batch production—differed from the assembly work at RCA. 
And, perhaps most important, this company and its employees worked out 
their history within the ever-changing context of an American and global 
capitalism that transcended even the dynamics of the food-processing industry, 
while external events (such as World War II) had enormous impacts on that 
history Yet even in the heyday of the Campbell Soup Company its experi-
ence was far from unique among American businesses. All companies sought 
to keep production costs low, and the strategies depicted in this book were 
duplicated, to varying degrees, across the American corporate landscape. 
As with most firms in America, the organization of production at Camp-
bell was tied in a complex manner to assumptions and expectations about 
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gender, race, and ethnicity. In the early decades of the twentieth century 
Campbell was the primary local employer of recent immigrants from south-
ern and eastern Europe—mostly Italians. Long before other major manu-
facturers in Camden hired nonwhite workers, Campbell employed African 
Americans and Puerto Ricans. But the company placed African Americans 
in only certain jobs and departments, and brought in Puerto Ricans, initially, 
only during the peak processing months. Similarly, most jobs were strictly 
gender-segregated, with women earning significantly less than men. Fur-
thermore, the contingent nature of work at Campbell left most employees 
unsure of the stability of their jobs: the company's boast that it was able to 
"offer year-round employment to three-quarters of its employees" was not 
very reassuring to its workers.6 
The Campbell Soup Company tapped into the same labor markets used 
by truck farmers in New Jersey (and more generally in Atlantic coastal agri-
culture) for virtually all of its recruitment efforts. It thus played a critical role 
as a transition point for agricultural laborers moving into the industrial sec-
tor. Historian Cindy Hahamovitch has documented the growth of a migrant 
stream of farmworkers along the Atlantic seaboard, starting in 1870. She 
found that this agricultural proletariat drew from Italians in South Jersey and 
Philadelphia and African Americans from the upper South; later it included 
African Americans from the lower South, Puerto Ricans, Jamaicans and 
other Caribbeans, and even German prisoners of war during World War II. 
Remarkably, Campbell used exactly the same groups to fill its factories.7 
In addition to segmentation of the workforce, automation and continuous 
redesign of the work process were central premises of the Campbell strategy 
to remain at its original site. For decades the company relied on the "Bedaux 
system," a variant of Taylorism developed by Charles Bedaux (later a Nazi 
collaborator). Throughout their existence, Campbell's Camden plants oper-
ated on a combination of hourly rates and wage incentive premiums for 
exceeding targets. 
The men and women who processed the tomatoes and chickens, cooked 
the soup, manufactured the cans, and did the myriad other tasks in the 
Campbell enterprise did not passively accept the company's strategies. For 
the most part they performed their often difficult jobs well and adapted to 
management's demands and experiments, but they also helped each other 
circumvent management plans, organized unions, went on strike, conducted 
unauthorized slowdowns, and in some cases sued the company. Alongside 
militant and sometimes violent strikes at Camden's other large companies, 
Campbell's workers staged walkouts in the mid-1950s, but they won their 
first union contract only in 1940. Through the next decade they built a 
remarkably democratic 
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remarkably democratic local of the left-leaning United Cannery, Agri-
cultural, Packing and Allied Workers of America (later renamed the Food, 
Tobacco, and Agricultural Workers, or FTA). A vicious red-baiting cam-
paign destroyed the FTA, but the United Packinghouse Workers of America 
(UPWA) local that took the place of the FTA local in the 1950s had many 
of the same activists as members and a similar dedication to racial and gender 
equality and unity. 
Despite continuous automation and rationalization of work processes, 
increasing demand for its products kept from four to five thousand work-
ers employed year-round at Campbell's Camden plants from the late 1930s 
through the 1950s. However, by the end of the 1960s, Campbell's auto-
mation, early attempts at "lean production," and the growth of plants else-
where led to a decline in the number employed to about three thousand. The 
reductions continued steadily through 1986, when management announced 
a three-year, thirty-seven-million-dollar modernization program for Cam-
den that would further reduce the number of workers from 1,700 to 1,250 
though, the company promised, "over the long term, the size of the work-
force at the plant may return to and even exceed its [then] present level." 
Nevertheless, three years later the announcement came that all production 
would cease the following year in Camden, with the work moving to newer 
plants such as the highly automated ones in Paris, Texas, and Maxton, North 
Carolina (see table l).8 
Table 1. Year-Round Production Employees, Campbell Soup Company, Camden, 
New Jersey, Plants 
1886 1934 1942 1946 1950 1958 1962 1968 1979 1986 1990 
Male 
Female 
Total 25 2400 
2450 
1554 
4004 
2547 
2284 
4831 5000 
2100 
2000 
4100 3000 
1941 
740 
2681 1850 1250 
Sources: 
1886: Mary B. Sim, History of Commercial Canning in New Jersey (Trenton: New Jersey Agricultural Society, 1951). 
1934: "Dorrance Defines Issues in Strike," Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), April 6,1934. 
1942-1946: U.S. Department of Labor, Mediation and Conciliation Service Records. 
1950: "Campbell Union OKs New Pact," Philadelphia Inquirer, March 21,1950. 
1958: Minutes of Canning Conference, May 18,1958, UPWA Papers. 
1962: Douglas Bedell, "Camden: A Case Study in Urban Economic Problems, Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), 
July 8,1962. 
1968: 
1979: 
1986: 
"Campbell Soup—Camden," January 17,1968, AMC Papers. 
Eileen Stillwell, "Campbell Cans 300 Employees," Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), April 21,1979. 
Campbell Soup Company, press release, January 27,1986, PR Newswire, retrieved August 10,2008 from 
Lexis-Nexis. 
Note: Some sources did not break numbers down by gender; only a total is given in these cases. 
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Scholars Journalists, and activists have warned about the strategies and ef-
fects of neoliberal capitalism at the beginning of the twenty-first century, in-
cluding not only the globalization of production but also the rise of unstable, 
contingent work, the growth of "lean production" and other methods that 
intensify work, and the increasing use of low-paid immigrants to fill various 
niches in the economy9 Often, however, these analyses have lacked any his-
torical depth—they seem to imply that these features of the early twenty-first 
century are entirely novel. Cowie's Capital Moves has demonstrated that plant 
shutdowns and moves to cheap labor areas were already a common corpo-
rate strategy before World War II. This book expands the examination of the 
historical precedents of neoliberal capital's strategies to look at the full range of 
those strategies—not just capital mobility—and, just as important, to uncover 
the varieties of labor's responses and evaluate their relative effectiveness. 
The impacts of recent corporate strategies have led some to conclude 
that the world of the new millennium is being transformed by the "manic 
logic of global capitalism." Prime among the helpless victims of globalization 
and post-Fordism, in this view, is labor. Many proponents of neoliberalism, 
and even some leftists, emphasize the weakness of labor resulting, apparently 
inevitably, from trends in the global economy since at least the 1970s. Other 
scholars and activists, however, see the mobility of capital and the changes 
in production characteristic of post-Fordism as far more complex and con-
tingent, and they challenge the notion that labors current weak state is pre-
determined. These alternative approaches revitalize the project of studying 
the full range of capitalist strategies vis-a-vis labor and reject the inevitability 
of labor s decline, instead proposing questions about which strategies on the 
part of workers are most successful in countering capitals hegemony.10 In the 
case of Campbell, the relative success its workers had in countering corpo-
rate strategies during the militant and united social-unionist period of 1940 
to 1968, and their relative failure later may provide evidence on the likely 
effectiveness of alternative labor strategies today. 
The structure of this book is basically chronological; such an organiza-
tion most clearly reflects the historical and dialectical development of the 
company and its workforce. However, the four dominant management 
strategies—continuous production redesign; the use of contingent labor and 
workforce segmentation; antiunionism and anticommunism; and movement 
of production—took on varying levels of importance over the course of this 
history. Certain chapters will thus go into more depth on one or another of 
these strategies. 
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the industry by the 1930s, included the invention (or at least the first mass 
marketing) of condensed soup, the pioneering use of advertising, the division 
of the workforce into permanent and seasonal sectors, and the introduction 
of the Bedaux system of scientific management in 1927. 
The next three chapters, which carry the history of the Camden plants 
from the mid-1930s through the mid-1950s, have much in common, but 
each focuses on a different management strategy. Chapter 2 counterposes 
Campbell's attempt to wrest complete control of the shop floor, through the 
use of scientific management, mechanization, and the old-fashioned "drive 
system," with workers' efforts to resist this move by organizing a union. 
World War II, the period of chapter 3, pushed the company to cast its net 
ever wider to find recruits for its low-wage, and especially its seasonal, work-
force. A massive campaign to bring in workers from Puerto Rico (imported 
with help from the War Manpower Cornmission) and elsewhere, and the 
union's demands that the company drop its ban on hiring black women, led 
to a labor force more diverse than ever, with important implications for both 
company and union. Company, government, and a union splinter group's 
attempts to break the Left-led union in the late 1940s and early 1950s (the 
period for chapter 4) bring into sharp relief the antiunion and anticommu-
nist strategies that were always present at Campbell. The company's failure 
to separate the Camden workers from their union and its leadership demon-
strates the other side of this complex period. Local 80 navigated the turbulent 
times remarkably well, affiliating with the antiracist UPWA after its national 
Communist-led union was destroyed. 
The man who brought together all of Campbell's production strategies 
during his presidency of the company from 1953 to 1972 was William Bev-
erly Murphy (1907-1994). Chapter 5 explores the period during which this 
hard-nosed anticommunist expanded the company's efforts to consolidate 
control of production and fought the inclusion of an antidiscrimination 
clause in the union contract, while building new plants in the South and in 
rural Ohio. Chapter 6 examines the pivotal event in the history of company-
union relations: the 1968 strike. Unions at all Campbell plants, in an unprec-
edented experiment in unity, waited until the start of tomato season, then all 
struck together, with the goal of winning coordinated bargaining and a com-
mon contract expiration date. Unfortunately for the union, that summer also 
saw the demise of the UPWA and its merger into the conservative Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters (AMC). The weakened union front was no match for 
the unyielding stance of Murphy, and the ensuing period witnessed a shift in 
Local 80's orientation from militant social unionism to a business unionism 
focused on maintaining wages and benefits. 
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The final two chapters deal with the period in which changes in trans-
portation, demographics, and food-processing technology made it possible, 
finally, for the Campbell Soup Company to consider moving production out 
of Camden. With divided and increasingly ineffective unions, the company 
was free to experiment with newer and better ways to control production 
and replace workers with machines, and then to abandon Campbell's original 
soup plant in 1990. Though some union activists in Camden and Mexican 
migrants in the Farm Labor Organizing Committee continued to challenge 
the company, the national A M C merged into the even less assertive United 
Food and Commercial Workers. In spite of promises to the contrary, Camp-
bell finally joined R C A and Camden's other industries, imploding Plant 
No. 1 in 1991 and moving production to automated plants in the low-wage 
South, as incoming president David Johnson proclaimed a new era of higher 
profits and more cost cutting. However, the shutdown did not herald unin-
terrupted smooth sailing for the company. In October 2001, seven hundred 
workers at the Paris, Texas, plant walked off their jobs and the company 
responded with a lockout; this dispute was resolved, but it demonstrated that 
the conflict between the corporation and the soup makers continues. 
One final word about what Condensed Capitalism is and is not. This book 
is an exploration in political economy that takes the form of a business 
history and a labor history. It uses the lens of one important company to 
get at questions of the relationship of capital and labor, the changes both 
have undergone throughout the twentieth century, and the strategies they 
have used to accomplish their goals. Though the people and the stories that 
emerge in this exploration are important in their own right and are often 
fascinating, this is not an ethnographic study nor a social history of Camden 
(nor, as mentioned earlier, an analysis of Campbell's marketing and distribu-
tion innovations). Others have produced or embarked on such projects, and 
many more are waiting to be written. One essential work that must be men-
tioned is Howard Gillette's Camden after the Fall. This insightful exposition of 
the transformation of Camden from industrial powerhouse to defeated city 
must be read to understand the context of Campbell's experience.11 
For Campbell's former workers in Camden, the story did not end on a 
bright note. But the food products they made, the families they raised, and 
the communities they built have become a deep-rooted part of the American 
landscape. Even more important for later generations, their trials, tribulations, 
and victories hold crucial lessons for how working people can confront 
global capital and, sometimes, win. 
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Making Campbell s Soup 
Camden, 1869-1935 
"Campbelltown: A Foretaste of Industrial 
Utopia": thus did the Philadelphia North American introduce its readers in 
1915 to the "model workman's colony" where John T Dorrance planned to 
move production of his famous Campbell's soups. Campbelltown was never 
built, and Campbell's main production facilities remained in the city of the 
company's birth, Camden, New Jersey, until they vanished in a spectacular 
planned implosion in 1991. Yet the motivations behind the imagined model 
town, despite the sudden decision to abandon it, reveal much about the core 
business philosophy of Dorrance and his successors.1 
In many ways, the idea of Campbelltown was a radical departure for the 
Joseph Campbell Company. Even twenty years later, the company had made 
only the feeblest attempts at paternalism, and Fortune magazine considered 
its philosophy "the purest laissez faire." But in 1915 the Progressive impulse 
attracted even Campbell president Dorrance during a visit to Britain. Inspired 
by Port Sunlight, the Lever Brothers' model workers' town in northwest 
England, he returned to Camden fired with an idea that would solve many 
of the problems unleashed by the remarkably rapid growth of the industry 
launched by his "invention" of condensed soup in 1897. The unplanned 
proliferation of buildings in Camden to handle the increases in production 
and the improvised access to rail and marine transport were obstacles that 
JL. <^,_ • • ..- ".' 
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a planned facility would eUminate. Further, he believed, the workers in the 
model town four miles south of Camden on the Delaware River would 
be rescued from the "depressing city" and the refreshing air and recreational 
opportunities would make for contented employees (and, no doubt, ones less 
susceptible to the lures of unionism).2 
The special attraction of the Campbelltown idea to Dorrance, however, 
lay in its potential to lower production costs through extracting greater p ro-
ductivity from its workers. The Joseph Campbell Company had pushed its 
way into a relatively secure niche in American industry by innovative use 
of advertising for a product that consumers did not previously realize they 
needed. The cornerstones of its marketing campaign were product quality 
and low cost—for decades the price of a can of Campbell's soup remained 
at ten cents. So strong was management's commitment to this price that 
company executives allegedly "knew that the psychological effect of rais-
ing their prices to 11 cents a can would prove disastrous to their business. 
So they decided to keep the price fixed at a dime and cut down expenses 
somewhere else." This "somewhere else," according to the latest tenets of 
scientific management, could be found in more rational direction of the 
workforce, more efficient design of production facilities, and increased use 
of technology to mechanize operations. Even the workers themselves could 
be made more productive. According to the calculus of Dorrance, the con-
gested, saloon-filled streets of Camden had a measurable impact on the 
company's bottom line: "I figure that drink weakens a man's efficiency 
10 per cent; and we are moving to Campbelltown soon because we want 
added efficiency"3 
Dorrance's short-lived dream, had he carried through with it, might have 
provided a solution to most of the problems he was encountering in con-
trolling production in a company rapidly advancing into the forefront of 
America's food industry, and Dorrance wanted to control every facet of 
producing Campbell's soups. To eliminate the problem of unreliable and 
innumerable suppliers of tomatoes and other ingredients, Campbelltown 
would have surrounded its factory and workers' homes with model farms 
turning out controlled quantities of consistently high quality ingredients. In 
place of the jumble of multistory buildings in Camden whose labyrinthine 
transport devices were subject to frequent breakdowns, the new plant would 
have been based on a radically new design: "All manufacturing floors will 
be on the same level, so constructed that the raw material will come in at 
one end and the filled cans will go out at the other." Prophetically, the ultra-
modern Maxton, Nor th Carolina, plant that replaced the six-story Camden 
plant seventy-five years later would utilize exactly this plan.4 
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• The Creation of an Industry 
In 1869, little of the company's remarkable future would have been obvious 
to anyone, including Joseph Campbell and Abraham Anderson. Anderson, 
a tinsmith, had opened a small cannery in 1862. His partnership seven years 
later with Joseph Campbell, a purchasing agent for a produce wholesaler, 
formed the basis for one of the many companies turning Camden into an 
industrial powerhouse. The transformation of the Village of Camden of the 
early nineteenth century into a city of twenty thousand by 1870 was due 
largely to industrial growth and its fortuitous location just across the Dela-
ware River from Philadelphia. The industrialization of Camden proceeded 
at an even faster pace during the final decades of the nineteenth century and 
the beginning of the twentieth, with the establishment of many factories at 
the forefront of American industry, including Victor Talking Machines and 
New York Shipbuilding. The Camden County Chamber of Commerce 
went so far as to claim that Camden was, by 1931, "truly New Jersey's most 
highly industrialized city and it leads the entire Nation in the proportion of 
its population engaged in industry."5 
Though the late nineteenth century was a time of explosive growth for 
American manufacturing as a whole, with production increasing sixfold 
between 1859 and 1899, food industries grew a remarkable fifteenfold dur-
ing the same period. As the population of the United States urbanized, an 
increasing number of food-processing functions moved off the farms and 
out of the consumer household. Furthermore, whole new categories of food 
products were created. Nicolas Appert's invention of a method to preserve 
food for Napoleon Bonaparte's armies gave birth to the canning industry, 
and the American Civil War created a demand that propelled the industry 
forward in the United States. The firms that emerged as the best-known 
American canning companies—Campbell's and H. J. Heinz—were both 
founded in the aftermath of the war in 1869.6 
Anderson sold his share in the new Camden business to Campbell in 
1873, and the last association of the Campbell family with the company 
ended in 1900 with the death of Joseph Campbell, but an earlier reorganiza-
tion of the partnership in 1882 brought in Arthur Dorrance, whose family 
would continue to play a leading role in the company into the 1990s. The 
most well known product of the Joseph Campbell Company was its canned 
South Jersey "beefsteak tomatoes," but it also sold a wide variety of other 
products, including ketchup, mincemeat, and preserves. South Jersey began 
acquiring its reputation as the best location for the cultivation of tomatoes in 
16 CHAPTER ONE MAKING CAA 
the 1840s, as its climate and soil proved to be ideal for this relatively recent 
addition to the American diet. The demand brought on by the Civil War 
persuaded more growers and canners in the area to specialize in tomatoes, 
and new varieties were developed that were better suited to canning. Very 
quickly South Jersey became the top tomato-growing region in the nation. 
Though canners in the area soon came to specialize in tomato products, their 
product lines were extensive. The small market for canned soup was domi-
nated by the Franco-American and Huckins companies, which produced 
ready-to-eat varieties selling for an expensive thirty-five cents per bulky 
thirty-two-ounce can, though Campbell also sold a small amount of ready-
to-eat tomato soup.7 
Arthur Dorrance succeeded Joseph Campbell as president of the firm 
then known as the Joseph Campbell Preserve Company in 1894, and three 
years later he hired his nephew, John T. Dorrance, allegedly with some reluc-
tance, to set up a laboratory, on the condition that his nephew fit out the 
lab at his own expense. Much has been made of the fact that the younger 
Dorrance, just returned from the University of Gottingen with a Ph.D. 
in chemistry, was paid only $7.50 per week, but as the scion of a wealthy 
family he was hardly concerned by the size of his salary. In any case, he set 
about with a passion to revolutionize the way soup was manufactured, sold, 
and consumed in the United States. His central concept—"the only basic 
idea that anyone in the Campbell Soup Co. ever had," according to a 1935 
Fortune magazine article—was to remove most of the water from canned 
soups. This process drastically reduced the amount of water the company 
needed to ship around the country, and housewives could reconstitute the 
soup in their own kitchens simply by adding a can of water. Condensing 
soup may not, however, have been as original an idea as Fortune and the 
company maintained. According to food historian Andrew F. Smith, Joseph 
Campbells original partner (and later competitor) Abraham Anderson was 
producing several varieties of "concentrated soup" at the time of Dorrance's 
"invention," and the Campbell company was likely working on condensing 
soups even before Dorrance arrived. Regardless of the provenance of the 
idea, the reduced shipping and warehousing costs enabled the company to 
sell ten-and-one-half ounce cans of condensed soup for ten cents. This the 
company did, and by 1900 Campbell soups were awarded a Gold Medallion 
at the Paris Exposition, and John T. Dorrance, at the age of twenty-seven, 
was elected a director.8 
Dorrance was born in 1873 in Bristol, Pennsylvania, the grandson of John 
Barnes Dorrance. The elder Dorrance had amassed a fortune before the 
Civil War in flour mills, lumber, shipping, and railroads. His illustrious career 
as owner of Bristol Mills 
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as owner of Bristol Mills was capped by the construction of the Dorrance 
Mansion, completed in 1863, its "elegant style representing] the lavish life 
of the early Victorian industrialists making Bristol their home."9 His son 
Arthur continued the family's tradition of investing in new businesses with 
high growth potentials when he became a partner in the Joseph Campbell 
Company. Arthur's brother John, however, hoped for a more genteel life for 
his offspring. He sent his son—John T. Dorrance—to Rugby Academy and 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and was pleased when Cornell 
University and Bryn Mawr College attempted to recruit him on his return 
from Gottingen. Though the father was disappointed when his son went to 
work in Camden, John T. Dorrance quickly demonstrated brilliant business 
acumen.10 Cornell may have lost a potential chemistry professor, but the 
university did ironically provide a key ingredient for the construction of the 
future consumer icon: the famous red-and-white colors for the~ soup-can 
labels. While company executives were mulling over label designs for their 
new product, company treasurer Heberton "Williams attended a University 
of Pennsylvania—Cornell football game. Impressed by Cornell's smart red-
and-white uniforms, he suggested that Campbell adopt the same colors. In 
January 1898 the first of the legendary red-and-white soup cans began roll-
ing out of the Camden factory.11 
Though the idea of condensing soups was essential to the future success 
of the firm, the fledgling soup company needed next to do something even 
more challenging: create a market. Combined sales of canned soups for all 
companies totaled a mere one million cans per year at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Part of the problem was that soup was not an important part of the 
American diet, and most of the soup that was eaten was generally prepared 
by women in their own kitchens, not bought in stores. Campbell under-
took a pioneering advertising campaign, first on cards in streetcars, then in 
magazines and newspapers. In some of the early advertisements, the company 
attempted to create and encourage insecurities in women about their roles as 
mothers and homemakers in a changing environment of modernity, a pre-
dicament that could be at least partially ameliorated by the purchase and use 
of Campbell's soups. In 1904 the company introduced the "Campbell Kids," 
who quickly became the firm's ubiquitous mascots. Historian Susan Strasser 
has demonstrated how the new mass-production, mass-distribution compa-
nies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries began to convert "a 
population used to homemade products and unbranded merchandise... into 
a national market for standardized, advertised brand-name goods," often by 
making people want things that they did not previously realize they needed. 
Campbell was an early master at this enterprise. The firm quickly became the 
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archetypal example of a brand-name consumer-products company Unhke 
its competitor, H. J. Heinz, which maintained a large sales force, Campbell 
relied almost entirely on appealing directly to the consumer through exten-
sive advertising and, in effect, virtually ignoring middlemen and retailers. 
Campbells soup, in fact, became "the most highly advertised single food 
product" in the United States. Through its early marketing campaigns, the 
Campbell's Soup brand became so well-known and trusted that no gro-
cers could afford not to carry the renowned red-and-white cans. By 1904, 
Campbell alone was selling sixteen million cans of soup.12 
The company fell more and more under the control of Dr. Dorrance in 
the ensuing years. He became general manager in 1910, and in 1914 suc-
ceeded his retiring uncle as president. He then quickly moved to sharpen 
the focus of the company to condensed soups, closing down production of 
preserves and other distractions. In 1915, while contemplating the ambitious 
move of the entire operation to his "industrial Utopia" of Campbeiltown, 
he bought up all the outstanding shares of company stock he could. Two 
weeks after the North American article on Campbeiltown appeared, his uncle 
sold him all his remaining stock and John T Dorrance became sole owner 
of the Joseph Campbell Company. Now able to control every aspect of 
the company's production, marketing, and future direction, he quietly aban-
doned his plans for Campbeiltown (though he never revealed his reasons) but 
did not relinquish the objective of turning his company into a scientifically 
run enterprise, with every element running smoothly under his expert guid-
ance. 13 Over the next several decades, Campbell Soup Company (the name 
adopted in 1922) financed its way to the top echelons of America's corpora-
tions solely through its own earnings (as did Henry Ford's motor company), 
rarely becoming indebted to anyone or anything outside the control of the 
Dorrance family 
Though Dorrance led Campbell's rise to its position as one of Camden's 
"Big Three" industries—along with RCA and New York Shipbuilding—he 
and the company remained curiously aloof from the civic activity that the 
city's other business leaders enthusiastically took up. RCA's Eldridge John-
son joined retail, real estate, and banking executives in forming the Greater 
Camden Movement (GCM), Camden's experiment in business-friendly 
Progressive Era reform. In another installment in the city's quest to escape 
from the shadow of Philadelphia, they promoted good government, led 
patriotic organizations during World War I, and campaigned to build the 
world-class Walt Whitman Hotel (in 1925) to provide a proper home for 
business meetings and visiting executives. The GCM's greatest achievement 
was the construction of the Delaware River Bridge in 1926 (later renamed 
the Benjamin Franklin Bri 
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the Benjamin Franklin Bridge) linking Camden and Philadelphia. Promoters 
claimed the bridge would lead to further growth for Camden and pave the 
way for the city's ascendance into the first rank of American cities. For a few 
years the predictions seemed to be coming true. The million-dollar Stanley 
Theater opened the same year as the bridge, followed by several major depart-
ment stores and some new manufacturing enterprises. Other consequences, 
such as the severing of North Camden from the rest of the city and the 
newfound ability of South Jersey suburbanites to speed past Camden on 
their way to Philadelphia would only later begin to raise questions about the 
impact of the bridge for Camden's future. Yet throughout this swirl of activ-
ity, Dorrance avoided the boosterism of his fellow industrialists and kept his 
focus single-mindedly on making soup and building his company. 
* Making Soup 
The rapid growth of the market for canned soup demanded massive expan-
sion of soup production in Camden. Dorrance tackled this task in his accus-
tomed systematic manner, but the nature of soup production and the way the 
business grew resulted initially in a curious mix of mass-production prac-
tices, creative processing techniques, and the most rudimentary manual labor. 
Dorrance's management methods were similarly an eclectic combination of 
classic nineteenth-century hard-driving factory management practices, the 
latest "scientific management" fads, and even some innovations in production 
that were remarkably similar to "lean production"—the Holy Grail of global 
manufacturing philosophy launched by Japanese automobile makers much 
later in the century. 
The Campbell factory spread out from its original location on Front Street 
near Market Street in Camden to a hodgepodge of interconnected buildings 
covering three large city blocks by the first decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. "Plant No. 1"—the term applied to the three-block agglomeration— 
remained the largest production site for Campbell Soup through the 1980s. 
An observer walking through the plant in 1990 (just before the implosion of 
the plant) reported that the nineteen buildings still standing were so intercon-
nected that, due to the removal of many interior walls, "it is hard to discern 
where one building ends and the other begins."14 
Despite these changes over the years, the manufacturing model for Plant 
No. 1 (and for all early Campbell plants) remained that of a simple gristmill. 
First, raw ingredients were transported to the top floors of the plant. As each 
step in the manufacturing process was completed, gravity transports carried 
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FIGURE 2. Conveyor belt carrying tomatoes into Campbell Soup plant. 
Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
the partially processed product down to the next level until, on the ground 
floor, the canned and labeled soup was packaged for shipment. Campbell 
workers turned raw ingredients into finished products in three main stages: 
ingredient preparation and inspection, blending, and, finally, can fdling and 
processing. This manufacturing design remained virtually unchanged from 
the time of the invention of condensed soup in 1897. What did change was 
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